1. Our subject is of no interest whatsoever. Not because the question is not worth asking, but because the answer seems utterly meaningless. How can an arbitrator have a role to play after rendering the award, since this very act marks the end of his or her assignment as arbitrator? It will be recalled that an arbitrator's function ends with the rendering of the award. 1 Indeed, rather than 'the role of the arbitrator', it would be more precise to speak of the role of the person who was formerly but is no longer the arbitrator.

2. An arbitrator's function lasts only as long as the proceedings themselves, i.e. from the moment the arbitrator accepts the assignment to the moment when he or she renders the award. It is however a fact that, for the sake of convenience, we talk of an arbitrator even before the function has been officially vested in an individual (e.g. an 'arbitrator's' duty to disclose) and after that function has come to an end. The same sacrifice to convenience will be made in the present article.

3. In practice, the post-award period is prepared before the award is rendered. When we talk of the arbitrator's role in the execution of the award, this does not merely mean what he or she does once the award has been finished. Here, as elsewhere, it is advisable to anticipate, for prevention is better than cure. Thus, the post-award stage is prepared in the award itself, in the conduct of the proceedings and maybe even at the stage of drafting the arbitration agreement. Far from being insignificant, our subject suddenly becomes very broad, as it covers the arbitration process in full.

4. Defying any temptation to digress, we shall take a simple approach inspired by the wise adage that an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure, and thus consider the role of the arbitrator in the execution of the award (i) before and (ii) after the rendering of the award.

I. Before

5. In principle, an arbitrator's obligations are most numerous before the award is rendered. They are also the least surprising. As an arbitrator's principal obligation is [Page44:] to render an award, the arbitrator's main tasks occupy the period up until the award is rendered. 2 After that, the arbitrator is discharged from his or her functions.

6. However, this does not mean that, prior to rendering the award, an arbitrator can afford not to take an interest in how it will subsequently be performed. This is indeed one of the arbitrator's duties. We know, from the writings of Neil MacCormick, that the force of arguments 'is only to show the permissibility of proposed decisions, not to make them obligatory'. 3 The same goes for arbitrators, who can be expected not just to render an award but to render an award that is capable of being performed; in other words, to do all they can to ensure that the award will be performed.

7. Hence, an arbitrator has a real obligation to take the execution of the award into account. It may indeed be added that what parties expect of arbitrators is not so much an award but rather an enforceable legal decision. This is the cause of the obligations the parties assume in their contract with the arbitrator, who is even chosen for his or her very ability to render an award that can be enforced by the winning party. 4 What, after all, would be the point of an award if it cannot be enforced anywhere? 'Little more than a scrap of paper' is the answer that has already been given by Professor Pierre Mayer. 5

8. An arbitrator therefore has an obligation to make an award that can be as effective as possible. This is a matter of good sense and no matter how obvious the obligation might be, it is not mentioned in any legislation and hardly touched on in case law. Only a few institutions, including ICC, mention it in their arbitration rules. Article 35 of the ICC Rules requires arbitrators to make every effort to ensure that the award is enforceable at law. 6

9. This obligation must therefore be seen to lie in the arbitrator's contract. 7 Judging from certain court decisions, there would even seem to be approval of arbitrators who go beyond the limited scope of their assignment and give full effect to their awards for the sake of the 'common will' of the parties or their 'legitimate and unequivocal expectation'. 8[Page45:]

10. This may indeed lead arbitrators to step outside the limitations of their function and use what can be called their 'duty of freedom'. 9 Concern over the execution of the award can, or even should, lead arbitrators to take initiatives that go beyond the restrictive framework imposed by the parties. Quite rightly, the arbitrator frees him or herself from this constraint in order to enable the award to be performed-for this was the common intention of the parties at the outset-while depriving neither party of the opportunity to be heard.

11. Clearly, the duty to take into account the execution of the award has consequences throughout the drafting of the award. During this period the arbitrator must act in accordance with the rules of the art of arbitration. 10 Arbitrators must therefore constantly ask themselves what is the likelihood that enforcement of the award will be authorized and that the award will be performed. 11 They will therefore need to be careful when establishing the facts of the case12 and drafting the award, 13 and they should not hesitate to take it upon themselves to correct or even reword clerical mistakes made by the parties, clarify vague or confused claims, etc.

12. Concern over the effectiveness of an award inevitably has repercussions on the substantive law applied, too. Arbitrators should adopt a pro-active approach, especially if there is more than one law that could be applied. 14 Going a step further, this could even be seen as explaining an arbitrator's obligation to respect mandatory laws. 15 The arbitrator's obligation to take into account the execution of the award makes him or her an indirect guardian of public policy. While judges are the guarantors of compliance with public policy, arbitrators are the guarantors of the execution of their awards and thus of their consistency with public policy. In this respect, the role of the judge, which is obvious and direct, is mirrored by that of the arbitrator which, albeit indirect, is no less certain, especially in countries like France and Switzerland where a 'flagrant, effective and concrete' infringement is all the courts look for when examining whether [Page46:] public policy has been respected. 16 This is the-unexpected-consequence of an arbitrator's obligation to make every effort to ensure that the award he or she renders is performable.

Once the award has been rendered, however, it becomes detached from the arbitrator, beyond his or her reach. Can the arbitrator nonetheless continue to assist in ensuring that it is performed?

II. After

13. Although an arbitrator is released from his or her duties once the award has been rendered, the arbitrator's ties with the award are not completely severed. The arbitrator has a special position in relation to the act he or she has accomplished. Although not the owner of the award, the arbitrator is not unrelated to it, as has long been recognized by the French courts. 17 The terminology used is significant: it is said that the arbitrator has 'rendered' the award to the parties. Nor does the arbitrator have any intellectual property rights over the award.

14. Although not a protected work, 18 an arbitral award is doubtless a 'work of the intellect', to use Cornu's expression. 19 The arbitrator's reasoning as set out in the award is not inconsequential. In some sense, the arbitrator him or herself is embodied in the document he or she has drafted and signed. This is sufficient to justify the arbitrator's right to see the award remain intact. It would be an illusion to try to completely dissociate arbitrators from their awards. The best proof of this is that no arbitrator likes to see the award he or she has produced set aside, even though arbitrators should never allow their judgment to be coloured by the fear of such a risk

An arbitrator can therefore legitimately expect that his or her award will remain intact and that the spirit of the award will not be compromised by its dissemination or its publication. The arbitrator can no doubt also demand of the parties, or anyone else, that if the award is produced, other than in a court of law in enforcement or setting-aside proceedings, the arbitrator's name should, or alternatively should not, appear.

In short, arbitrators are in a special position vis-à-vis 'their' awards. [Page47:]

15. A further illustration is found in the surprising question faced by French courts in the Raoul Duval case, in which an arbitrator initiated third-party proceedings against a judgment setting aside the award he had rendered. His action was held to be inadmissible for the very reason that he was not a third party with respect to the award: 'No one can be judge and party . . . an arbitrator exercises a jurisdictional function, which means that the arbitrator cannot request that the decision whose very purpose was to censure the award in which he participated shall have no effect upon him.' 20 As neither a party nor a third party, an arbitrator thus has a special relationship with the award, which raises the question of whether the arbitrator can be called upon to assist in the execution of the award.

16. In practice, there are three levels at which an arbitrator may intervene to assist in the execution of the award, regardless of its status (interlocutory, partial or final). The three levels depend on the extent of involvement sought. The first two are standard, while the third is less well known but is becoming more widespread.

17. Level 1: improvement of the award.. Most arbitration laws and rules provide that an arbitrator may amend the award he or she has rendered if it contains gaps or imperfections, so as to complete or correct it. This is, for instance, the case of the ICC Rules of Arbitration (Art. 29). Whenever an arbitrator intervenes in this manner, he or she facilitates the execution of the award, provided its meaning is not altered. 21

18. Level 2: participation in procedures for enforcing the award. In some legal systems, arbitrators are required to take the steps necessary for registering the award with the legal authorities or any other course of action allowing the award to be enforced. This is, for instance, the case in Article 1691 of the Belgian Judicial Code. There is also express provision to this effect in certain arbitration rules, such as the ICC Rules of Arbitration, Article 28(5) of which states that: 'The Arbitral Tribunal and the Secretariat shall assist the parties in complying with whatever further formalities may be necessary.' Such provisions place an additional obligation upon arbitrators.

19. Level 3: involvement in setting-aside proceedings. An arbitrator may find him or herself involuntarily drawn into an action initiated by one of the parties against the award he or she has rendered. This may happen in one of two ways: either the arbitrator is at the origin of the setting-aside action, as in the aforementioned Raoul Duval case where the arbitrator had started to work for one of the parties on the day after the award was rendered, which led to the award being set aside; 22 or the arbitrator is called upon during the setting-aside proceedings. The second situation, which used to be rare, has become more common. The arbitrator's involvement varies in extent.

20. An example is Swiss law on post-arbitration litigation, which provides that arbitrators may be called upon for the purposes of actions brought in the Federal Tribunal against awards they have rendered. This is an interesting approach, insofar as it clearly shows [Page48:] that arbitrators cannot abandon all interest in the fate of their awards. Usually, the Federal Tribunal asks the arbitrator if he or she has any comments to make, the arbitrator chooses to reply or not to reply, and the matter stops there.

Sometimes, however, the Swiss court goes further, as in the Fund case, 23 where a search was made in the offices of the chairman of the arbitral tribunal, leading to the confiscation of all the documents and minutes of witness hearings in the arbitration proceedings. Even though this may have been a special case, with a criminal dimension to it, it shows that the offices of arbitrators can now be 'desanctuarized'!

21. Sometimes, the arbitrator's involvement in the enforcement of the award results from a more forceful approach, as illustrated in two recent cases. The first comes from Norway, where one of the parties to the arbitration proceedings asked the court in which the action against the award was filed to call the arbitrators who had rendered the award. The Oslo court consented to call the chairman of the arbitral tribunal only. The other party appealed against the decision. The Appeals Committee of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and allowed the chairman alone to be called, on the grounds that it was necessary to ensure that certain substantive issues had actually been discussed. 24 We thus have here the chairman of an arbitral tribunal under obligation to explain to a Norwegian court the tenor of discussions between the parties during the arbitration proceedings.

22. The second example, which is even more worrying, concerns an experienced Swiss arbitrator who had chaired an arbitral tribunal in an international dispute involving a Thai company. After rendering the award, the arbitrator was called by the Thai court in which the award had been challenged. Rightly or wrongly, the court considered that this was a domestic arbitration and that the arbitrator could be required to give explanations, as Thai court procedure allows.

23. Such requests raise two questions: firstly, is it part of an arbitrator's job to provide this kind of after-sales service for the award he or she has rendered; and secondly (and more importantly from the arbitrator's perspective), who bears the costs resulting from such a service?

24. In answer to the first question, there is no reason why a person who has been an arbitrator should be required to bow to calls for explanations on an award that he or she helped to render. Like judges, arbitrators do not have to explain their decisions. In principle, all the explanations they need to give should already appear in the award, in what is referred to as the reasoning. Other than in situations where an accusation is brought against the arbitrator personally (as part of a civil action based on contractual liability), an arbitrator has no obligation to provide additional information.

25. Besides, an arbitrator is bound by the confidentiality of arbitration and even more so by that of the deliberations. 25 Confidentiality is a natural component of arbitration, 26[Page49:] a contractual obligation incumbent on the arbitrator, 27 and a requirement imposed on the players in arbitral proceedings by most arbitration rules. 28 In principle, therefore, an arbitrator cannot reveal anything about an arbitration unless compelled to do so by government or the courts. 29 And even if this is the case, the arbitrator must never breach the secrecy of the deliberations.

26. Yet, this negative answer needs to be qualified in two respects, depending on the degree of force imposed on the arbitrator. Firstly, an arbitrator can be required to appear in court, and a fine may be levied in the event of delay. In this case, the arbitrator has no choice but to obey.

Secondly, there may be quite strong-although less direct-pressure. Is there not a risk that an arbitrator who does not go before a court when asked to do so would weaken the award? If the award is set aside by the court for lack of sufficient information from the arbitrator, there is a risk that the arbitrator could be sued on grounds of civil liability by the party in whose favour the award was rendered-especially if that party has been present throughout the proceedings, paid the costs of the arbitration and obtained a favourable award which in the end is set aside because the arbitrator refused to provide explanations to the court hearing the setting-aside action.

27. This is to say nothing of cases in which the court's request for explanations or testimony concerns the arbitrator in person, as when the challenge against the award is based on a lack of independence on the part of the arbitrator. Can the arbitrator really refuse to provide the explanations asked of him or her, even in the form of a written deposition? This would be risky for the arbitrator as well as for the award.

28. There are therefore situations in which an arbitrator will have to, or will wish to, testify. This brings us to the second question of costs: who bears them?

This is not an innocuous question, for it may be a matter of appearing before a Thai court, which presupposes travel and accommodation expenses, to say nothing of the time spent on making the testimony. If, in addition, it is necessary to prepare arguments, undertake research, seek opinions or advice-if only on whether or not to testify-the cost will be even higher. It is unlikely that at this stage of the proceedings the parties would be prepared to bear these additional costs. And it would be ill-fitting for them to be borne by only one party, especially if that party won in the arbitration award and is defending it against the attempt to have it set aside. The cost of this after-sales service thus falls ultimately on the arbitrator.

29. The arbitrator can, of course, try to limit the costs by asking to be allowed to provide only a written deposition, or to be heard by a court where he or she resides or by videoconference, so as to avoid travelling. The answer, however, will depend on the good will of the court hearing the setting-aside action.

30. There remains one further solution, which would be to anticipate such difficulties in the Terms of Reference, by providing that any additional costs linked to post-arbitration proceedings will be borne jointly by the parties. Given the increasing frequency with [Page50:] which courts are calling upon arbitrators, it is possible that such clauses will become more common, even if there is no certainty that the sums incurred by the arbitrator will be refunded by the losing party that has challenged the award. However, at least there will be proof of the sum owed to the arbitrator.

31. One might ask whether the best course of action would not be to seek a solution in the legal relationship that exists between the arbitrator and the parties, i.e. in the arbitrator's contract. Is it not conceivable that obligations relating to the execution of awards be contractualized as part of the arbitrator's contract? There is no reason why an arbitrator should not obtain personally from the parties a contractual undertaking regarding the execution of the award. Incongruous though it may seem, this possibility was contemplated long ago by Plautus. In one of his plays, an arbitrator accepts office subject to the express condition that the parties declare in advance that they will perform the future award:

Animum advortite, si possum hoc inter vos componere. . . . Dicam meam sententiam, Siquidem voltis quod decrero facere.

Tibi permittimus . 30

And so it was.

1
Unless exceptions have been provided, as in German law (Code of Civil Procedure, Arts. 563-1, 1056-3 and 1059-4), English law (Arbitration Act 1996, ss. 68-3-a, 69-7-c, 70-4, 70-5 and 71-3) or Brazilian law (Law No. 9307/96, Art. 33 § 2).

2
T. Clay, L'arbitre. pref. P. Fouchard (Dalloz, Series Nouvelle bibliothèque de thèses, vol. 2, 2001) esp. paras. 769-834; E. Gaillard & J. Savage, eds., Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman On International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 1999) esp. paras. 1127-1156; Ch. Seraglini in J. Beguin & M. Menjucq, eds., Droit du commerce international (Litec, Series Traités, 2005) esp. para. 2656; J.-F. Poudret & S. Besson, Droit comparé de l'arbitrage international (Bruylant/LGDJ/Schulthess, 2002) para. 450 et seq.; P. Level, 'Brèves réflexions sur l'office de l'arbitre' in Nouveaux juges, nouveaux pouvoirs ? Mélanges Roger Perrot. (Dalloz, 1996) 259.

3
N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 1978) at 188-89.

4
See J.-L. Delvolvé, 'L'instance arbitrale' in Arbitrage et propriété intellectuelle, Colloquium, Institut de recherche en propriété intellectuelle, 26 Jan. 1994 (Librairies techniques, Series Le droit des affaires-Propriété intellectuelle, no. 12, 1994) 41 esp. at 42.

5
P. Mayer, 'L'autonomie de l'arbitre international dans l'appréciation de sa propre compétence' Hague Academy of International Law, Collected Courses, 1989, vol. 217, esp. para. 36.

6
M.W. Bühler & T.H. Webster, Handbook of ICC Arbitration: Commentary, Precedents, Materials, 2d ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) esp. paras. 35-1- 35-14. See also LCIA Rules (Art. 32-2).

7
See T. Clay, L'arbitre, supra note 2, esp. paras. 831-834.

8
E.g. Paris Court of Appeal, 8 Mar. 1990 (Coumet, ès qual. et Ducler), Rev. arb. 1990.675 (2d case), Annot. P. Mayer; Paris Court of Appeal, 28 May 1993 (Sté générale pour l'Industrie), Rev. arb. 1993.664, Annot. D. Bureau; RCDIP 1994.349, Annot. V. Heuzé; RTD com. 1994.703, Annot. J.C. Dubarry & E. Loquin; Paris Court of Appeal, 20 June 1996 (Sté PARIS), Rev. arb. 1996.657, Annot. D. Bureau; IBLJ/RDAI 1997.371, Annot. C. Imhoos; Paris Court of Appeal, 5 Mar. 1998 (Sté Forasol), Rev. arb. 1999.86, Annot. E. Gaillard; IBLJ/RDAI 1999.480, Annot. C. Imhoos; Paris Court of Appeal, 2 Apr. 1998 (Sté Technip), Rev. arb. 1999.821, Annot. B. Leurent; IBLJ/RDAI 2000.266, Annot. C. Imhoos. On this question see Y. Derains, 'Attente légitime des parties et droit applicable au fond en matière d'arbitrage international', Travaux comité fr. DIP 1984-1985, 81.

9
T. Clay, L'arbitre, supra note 2, esp. paras. 806-813, 832 and 1089. See also M. de Boisséson, Le droit français de l'arbitrage interne et international, pref. P. Bellet (GLN Joly, 1990) esp. para. 667 (the fact that an arbitrator submits to the will of the parties does not imply that the arbitrator gives up his or her sovereignty or freedom as arbitrator).

10
The expression comes from Pierre Mayer in 'L'autonomie de l'arbitre international dans l'appréciation de sa propre compétence', supra note 5.

11
P. Mayer, 'Le contrat illicite' in 'L'arbitre et le contrat', Symposium organized by the Comité français de l'arbitrage, Paris, 12 Jan. 1984, Rev. arb. 1984.205, esp. 206.

12
See P. Bellet, 'Présentation de la chronique des décisions de procédure' Clunet (JDI) 1993.1059.

13
See A. Plantey, 'L'arbitrage international dans les nouveaux enjeux culturels mondiaux' in Mélanges Ottoarndt Glossner (Heidelberg: Recht und Wirtschaft, 1993) 241, esp. 249.

14
See P. Mayer, supra note 5, esp. paras. 36-38.

15
See P. Mayer, 'Le contrat illicite', supra note 11 at 220. See also C. Seraglini, Lois de police et justice arbitrale internationale, pref. P. Mayer (Dalloz, Series Nouvelle bibliothèque de thèses, vol. 10, 2001) esp. paras. 371-391.

16
Paris Court of Appeal, 18 Nov. 2004 (Thales), Rev. arb. 2005.751, Annot. p. 529 by L.G. Radicati di Brozolo; RCDIP 2006.104, Annot. S. Bollée; JCP 2005.II.10039, Annot. G. Chabot; Rev. Lamy de la concurrence 2005, no. 2, p. 68, Annot. E. Barbier de La Serre & C. Nourissat; Clunet (JDI) 2005.357, Annot. A. Mourre; D. 2005.Panor.3058 & 3059, Annot. T. Clay; JCP 2005.I.134 § 8, Annot. C. Seraglini; Gaz. Pal. 21-22 Oct. 2005, p. 5, Annot. C. Seraglini; RTD com. 2005.263, Annot. E. Loquin; Concurrences, Revue des droits de la concurrence, 2005, no. 1, p. 1, Annot. Cl. Lucas de Leyssac; (2005) 22:3 J. Int. Arb. 239, Annot. D. Bensaude; SIAR 2005, vol. 2, p. 209, Annot. D. de Groot; Paris Court of Appeal, 23 Mar. 2006 (Sté SNF), D. 2006.Panor.3032 et 3033, Annot. T. Clay; Rev. arb. 2007.100, Annot. S. Bollée; D. 2007.Panor.2571, Annot. S. Bollée; and on appeal to the supreme court: Cass. civ. 1re, 4 June 2008, Rev. arb. 2008.473, Annot. I. Fadlallah ; D. 2008.AJ. 1684, Annot. X. Delpech ; JCP 2008.I.164 § 8, Annot. C. Seraglini; JCP 2008.Act.430, Annot. J. Ortscheidt; Petites affiches 2008, no. 199, p. 21, Annot. P. Duprey; RTDcom. 2008.518, Annot. E. Loquin; Clunet (JDI) 2008.1107, Annot. A. Mourre; D. 2008.Panor.2560, Annot. L. d'Avout & S. Bollée; D. 2008.Panor.3118, Annot. T. Clay; JCP 2009.I.107 § 15, Annot. D. Lawnicka ; Petites affiches 2009, no. 61, p. 8, Annot. A. Malan; Arbitrage-adr no. 1468, Annot. J. Ortscheidt; Global Arbitration Review 23 June 2008. See also C. Seraglini, 'Le contrôle de la sentence au regard de l'ordre public international par le juge étatique: mythes et réalités', Gaz. Pal., Cah. arb. 2009/1, 20-21 Mar. 2009, 5.

17
Lyon Court of Appeal, 14 July 1828 (Constantin), S. 1829.II.83; Jur. gén., Vis Arbitrage-Arbitre, esp. para. 1328 ad notam.

18
See Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman On International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 2, esp. para. 1168.

19
G. Cornu, Linguistique juridique, 3d ed. (Montchrestien, Series Domat droit privé, 2005) esp. para. 90.

20
Cass. civ. 1re, 16 Dec. 1997 (Raoul Duval), Rev. arb. 1999.253; Gaz. Pal. 1st & 2 Jul. 1998.Jurispr.29, Annot. B. Sagon. For a better explanation, see appealed judgment: Paris Court of Appeal, 6 Dec. 1994, Rev. arb. 1996.411 (3d case), Annot. P. Fouchard p. 325, esp. paras. 19, 31, 65, 73 et seq.; Gaz. Pal. 1995.1.Jurispr.207, and Annot.; JCP 1995.I.3891 § 16, Annot. L. Cadiet. This judgment refers directly to a comparable decision involving a judge. The judge in question, who was well known for the conviction with which he defended his decisions in the legal press, instituted third-party proceedings against a judgment overturning an order he had issued in summary proceedings. His action was logically held to be inadmissible. (Metz Court of Appeal, 27 Oct. 1987 (J. Bidalou), JCP 1988.II.21093, Annot. L. Cadiet).

21
For a recent example of an interpretation that distorted the award, see French Cour de cassation, 1re civ., 8 July 2009 (Stulman), appeal no. 08-17.984, Arbitrage-adr no. 1663, Annot. T. Clay.

22
Paris Court of Appeal, 2 July 1992, Rev. arb. 1996.411 (1st case), Annot. P. Fouchard p. 325, esp. paras. 19, 31, 65, 73 et seq.

23
Swiss Tribunal fédéral, 19 Feb. 2007 (B. Fund Ltd), ATF 133 III 139, Rev. arb. 2008.758, Annot. P.-Y. Tschanz & I. Fellarth Gazzini.

24
Supreme Court, Appeals Committee, 14 Mar. 2008 (Trygg-Hanso Försäkringsaktiebolag v. If Skadeförsäkring AB), unpublished

25
J.-D. Bredin, 'Le secret du délibéré arbitral' in Mélanges Pierre Bellet (Litec, 1991) 71.

26
T. Clay, L'arbitre, supra note 2, esp. para. 771; S. Jarvin & G. Reid, 'La confidentialité dans l'arbitrage: épilogue de l'affaire Bulbank', Annotation of Swedish Supreme Court, 27 Oct. 2000, Rev. arb. 2001.827, esp. paras. 11-12.

27
E. Loquin, 'Les obligations de confidentialité dans l'arbitrage', Rev. arb. 2006.339, esp. para. 26; J.-F. Poudret & S. Besson, Droit comparé de l'arbitrage international, supra note 2, esp. paras. 374 and 444. See also Confidentiality in Arbitration: Commentaries on Rules, Statutes, Case Law and Practice, ICC ICArb. Bull., 2009 Special Supplement, foreword by J. Beechey (ICC, 2009).

28
E.g. ICC Rules (Arts. 20(7) and 21(3)); see. M.W. Bühler & T.H. Webster, supra note 6, esp. paras. 20-83-20-97); LCIA Rules (Art. 30); AAA Rules (Art. 34), Rules of the Paris Mediation and Arbitration Centre (CMAP) (Art. 16.4). It is also found in deontological rules, such as those of the IBA and the CMAP.

29
F. Fages, 'La confidentialité de l'arbitrage à l'épreuve de la transparence financière' Rev. arb. 2003.5.

30
Plautus, Curculio (Act V, Scene 3) : 'Give me your attention and let me see if I can settle your difficulties. . . . I'll state my opinion, that is, if you both are willing to accept my verdict. - We leave it to you.' (trans. P. Nixon, Loeb Classical Library, Heinemann).